2025-01-01 · conference-paper · Software Engineering Research · en
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Functionality-specific vulnerabilities, which mainly occur in Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) with specific functionalities, are crucial for software developers to detect and avoid. When detecting individual functionality-specific vulnerabilities, the existing two categories of approaches are ineffective because they consider only the API bodies and are unable to handle diverse implementations of functionality-equivalent APIs. To effectively detect functionality-specific vulnerabilities, we propose APISS, the first approach to utilize API doc strings and signatures instead of API bodies. APISS first retrieves functionality-equivalent APIs for APIs with existing vulnerabilities and then migrates Proof-of-Concepts (PoCs) of the existing vulnerabilities for newly detected vulnerable APIs. To retrieve functionality-equivalent APIs, we leverage a Large Language Model for API embedding to improve the accuracy and address the effectiveness and scalability issues suffered by the existing approaches. To migrate PoCs of the existing vulnerabilities for newly detected vulnerable APIs, we design a semi-automatic schema to substantially reduce manual costs. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation to empirically compare APISS with four state-of-the-art approaches of detecting vulnerabilities and two state-of-the-art approaches of retrieving functionality-equivalent APIs. The evaluation subjects include 180 widely used Java repositories using 10 existing vulnerabilities, along with their PoCs. The results show that APISS effectively retrieves functionality-equivalent APIs, achieving a Top-1 Accuracy of 0.81 while the best of the baselines under comparison achieves only 0.55. APISS is highly efficient: the manual costs are within 10 minutes per vulnerability and the end-to-end runtime overhead of testing one candidate API is less than 2 hours. APISS detects 179 new vulnerabilities and receives 60 new CVE IDs, bringing high value to security practice.
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This paper is a conference paper in software engineering research focused on detecting vulnerabilities tied to particular functionality by retrieving functionality-equivalent APIs in open-source repositories. As a conference paper, this work carries the expectation of conference peer review, so it can be given more weight than an unreviewed preprint, while its specific venue and review standards are not specified here.
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This work was produced by a small team of 3 researchers.
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With 15249 citations, this work is already an established reference point in its field, signaling outsized influence rather than an early-stage signal. It references 0 works, indicating no cited prior literature in the available record.
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Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories is a conference-paper, focusing on Software Engineering Research, published in 2025.
Detecting Functionality-Specific Vulnerabilities via Retrieving Individual Functionality-Equivalent APIs in Open-Source Repositories has 15,249 citations in our record, placing it among the highly cited works we track.
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